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| Infrastructure (end of Cherry) | ||
| Criteria | Result / Proof point | |
|---|---|---|
Working build system | ||
| If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. | yes | LF jenkins |
| It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. | yes | LF jenkins |
| The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. | yes | |
Automated test suite | ||
| The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). | yes | Ex. make dryrun |
| A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby). | yes | scripts |
| It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. | yes | |
| It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). | yes | |
New functionality testing | ||
| The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met. | Met | Code Style and contribution guideyes |
| The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project. | no (fix-priority high) | |
| It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice. | no (fix-priority medium) | |
Warning flags | ||
| The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. | partial (fix-priority medium) | |
| The project MUST address warnings. | yes | |
It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early. | yes | All test failures, notified issues/bugs and Sonar warnings are acted on promptly. Such issues are tracked using Jira and Gerrit (See above). |
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| Infrastructure (end of Cherry) | |||
| Criteria | Result / Proof point | ||
|---|---|---|---|
Secure development knowledge | |||
| The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) | yes | the PTL and many members are trained for this | |
| At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. | yes | the PTL and many members are trained for this | |
Use basic good cryptographic practices | |||
| The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used).These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities. | yes | no TLS yet, but once it comes in Dawn we need to assure this. | |
| If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. | yes | ||
| All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative. | yes | ||
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled.These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability). | yes | no TLS yet, but once it comes in Dawn we need to assure this. | |
| The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. | yes | no TLS yet, but once it comes in Dawn we need to assure this. | |
| The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). | yes | no TLS yet, but once it comes in Dawn we need to assure this. | |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. | yes | no TLS yet, but once it comes in Dawn we need to assure this. | |
| If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet). | no (fix-priority high) | yes | No users' passwords are handled.prio 1: implement for netconf |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. | yes | no TLS yet, but once it comes in Dawn we need to assure this. | |
Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks | |||
| The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. | yes | ||
| A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. | yes | ||
Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed | |||
| There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. | no (fix-priority high)yes | ||
| Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. | no (fix-priority low)yes | ||
Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed | |||
| is intended to limit public access. A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access. | TODOyes | All sample/provided credentials are for test/demo purposes only. | |
Analysis (8 Points)
(Result/Proof point (column A: enter Met/Unmet; Column B: enter relevant URLs/comments)
| Infrastructure (end of Cherry) | |||
| Criteria | Result / Proof point | ||
|---|---|---|---|
Static code analysis | |||
| At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. | yes | Sonar | |
| It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. | partial (fix-priority medium) | TODO-check container build systemyes | |
| All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. | yes | All reports are acted upon continuously. | |
| It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. | yes | ||
Dynamic code analysis | |||
| It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. | yes | code coverage tool | |
| It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). | no (fix-priority low) | ||
| It is SUGGESTED that the software produced by the project include many run-time assertions that are checked during dynamic analysis. | no (fix-priority low) | ||
| All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. | yet | Currently no exploitable vulnerabilities to our knowledge. If it has, will address it asap. | |
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