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| O-DU High | ||
| Criteria | Result / Proof point | |
|---|---|---|
Secure development knowledge | ||
| The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) | Met | |
| At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. | Met | |
Use basic good cryptographic practices | ||
| The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used).These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities. | Met | NA to the project currently |
| If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. | Met | NA to the project currently |
| All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative. | Met | NA to the project currently |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled.These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability). | Met | NA to the project currently |
| The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. | Met | NA to the project currently |
| The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). | Met | NA to the project currently |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. | Met | NA to the project currently |
| If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet). | Partially met | Needs deeper checking from O1 perspective |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. | Met | NA to the project currently |
Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks | ||
| The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. | ||
| A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. | ||
Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed | ||
| There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. | ||
| Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. | Met | |
Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed | ||
| is intended to limit public access. A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access. | Met | |
Analysis (8 Points)
(Result/Proof point (column A: enter Met/Unmet; Column B: enter relevant URLs/comments)
| O-DU High | ||
| Result / Proof point | ||
|---|---|---|
Static code analysis | ||
| At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. | Unmet | |
| It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. | Unmet | |
| All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. | Unmet | |
| It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. | Unmet | |
Dynamic code analysis | ||
| It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. | Met | Valgrind being used by developers |
| It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). | Unmet | Valgrind not automated |
| It is SUGGESTED that the software produced by the project include many run-time assertions that are checked during dynamic analysis. | Met | Valgrind being used by developers |
| All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. | Met | Tests using valgrind |