...
| O-DU High | ||
| Criteria | Result / Proof point | |
|---|---|---|
Bug-reporting process | ||
| The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) | Met | Jira : https://jira.o-ran-sc.org/projects/ODUHIGH Mailing list : https://lists.o-ran-sc.org/g/discuss: discuss@lists.o-ran-sc.org |
| The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. | Met | Jira : https://jira.o-ran-sc.org/projects/ODUHIGH |
| The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. | Met | |
| The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). | Met | |
| The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) | UnmetMet | https://jira.o-ran-sc.org/projects/ODUHIGH/issues/ |
Vulnerability report process | ||
| The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) | Unmet | |
If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A). | Unmet | |
The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A). | Unmet | |
...
| O-DU High | ||
| Criteria | Result / Proof point | |
|---|---|---|
Secure development knowledge | ||
| The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) | Met | |
| At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. | Met | |
Use basic good cryptographic practices | ||
| The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used).These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities. | Met | NA to the project currentlyTLS in progress in D release |
| If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. | MetNA to the project currently | TLS in progress in D release |
| All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative. | Met | NA to the project currentlyTLS in progress in D release |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled.These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability). | Met | NA to the project currentlyTLS in progress in D release |
| The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. | MetNA to the project currently | TLS in progress in D release |
| The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). | MetNA to the project currently | TLS in progress in D release |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. | MetNA to the project currently | TLS in progress in D release |
| If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet). | Partially met | Needs deeper checking from O1 perspective |
| The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. | MetNA to the project currently | TLS in progress in D release |
Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks | ||
| The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. | Met | TLS in progress in D release |
| A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. | Met | TLS in progress in D release |
Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed | ||
| There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. | Partially met | JIRA being used currently |
| Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. | Met | |
Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed | ||
| is intended to limit public access. A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access. | Met | |
...